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This study examines the reasons for earnings management in Malaysia by 
using a sample of companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
Traditional explanatory variables for earnings management (such as size 
and debt-to-equity ratio), tax rate, internal financing, and ownership variables 
were included in the model to explain the choices of accounting accruals. The 
study uses data for public companies for years 1995 to 1999. Since the economic 
downturn (1997) and market crash (1998) years are included in the study, 
this research is also able to evaluate the effect of these events on earnings 
management. This study finds that at least two factors affect earnings 
management in Malaysia; size of the company, and nominee s (security brokers 
and investment bankers) ownership. 
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Introduction 
Current news about firms such as Enron has brought more attention to the 
questions of how and why firms manage earnings. Accounting numbers form a 
fundamental part of an organization's efficient contracting technology. Since 
many of the terms, conditions, and covenants found in contracts use accounting 
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variables, contractual arrangements and the associated contracting costs are major 
determinants of accounting method choices (hence earnings management). Thus, 
contracting theory is able to predict and explain accounting choices (see Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Watts, 1977, Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979 among others)). Some 
reasons for these choices include the existence of contracts between the firms and external/ 
internal parties and market pressure for firms to perform at an expected level. 
It is sometimes suggested that the practice of earnings management often results in 
inaccurate and misleading financial reports. The income reported in the financial statements 
is not an exact amount but rather is an amount selected from a continuum of amounts 
derived from the application of different acceptable accounting accrual choices (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999 and Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Firms can choose between various 
allowable accounting methods or can apply different assumptions or estimates within an 
accounting method. Hence, the role of accrual accounting is believed to have caused 
some forms of earnings management, such as income smoothing, which are hard to 
distinguish from appropriate accrual accounting choices. The practice of earnings 
management has digressed from the primary focus of financial reporting, which is to 
provide information on the company's performance measured by earnings and its 
components (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 
Pressure to manage earnings does not stem from a single force. Factors such as 
analysts' forecasts, access to debt markets, competition, contractual obligation, a roaring 
stock market, new financial transactions, market disregard of big charges, merger 
attractiveness, management compensation, short-term focus, unrealistic plans and 
budgets, period-end requests from superiors, periods of excessive profit followed by a 
fear of subsequent decline, concealing unlawful transactions, personal bonuses, 
promotions, focus on team, and job retention are among the reasons that are mentioned in 
the literature (Duncan, 2001). The effects of these variables on earnings management in 
different countries may be different. For example, the debt hypothesis suggests that the 
larger the firm's debt-to-equity ratio the more managers are expected to choose income-
increasing accruals. However, in the Japanese business environment this hypothesis 
does not hold. It is known that managers of larger companies in Japan are more likely to 
choose income-decreasing accruals (Kester, 1992; Phan and Yoshikawa, 1996; Pourjalali 
and Hansen, 1996). 
There is evidence that managers of companies in both Japan and the United States 
chose income-increasing accounting accruals to increase their bonuses and the amount 
of outside funding. For Japanese companies income-increasing choices were also found 
to be positively associated with the ownership by individual investors and trust companies, 
but negatively associated with ownership by other corporations and financial institutions 
(Darrough, Pourjalali, and Saudagaran, 1998). The choices of accounting accruals by 
managers may also be affected by differences in the socio-economic and institutional 
environments in different countries. Furthermore, sudden economic changes (such as 
sudden market declines or market growth) may result in different incentive sets for earnings 
management. For example, the 1990 market crash in Japan resulted in changes in economic 
factors which had an identifiable effect on the choices of accounting accruals (Darrough, 
Pourjalali, and Saudagaran, 1998). 
Roubi and Richardson, (1998) study earnings management of nonmanufacturing 
companies in Malaysia, Singapore and Canada in response to changes in tax rates. Their 
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analysis provides evidence on managing current discretionary accruals by companies in 
Canada and Singapore similar to that found for the USA. They attribute weaker Malaysian 
results to cultural factors. 
Adhikari, et. al (2005) also investigate earnings management of Malaysian companies 
in response to anticipated changes in tax policy. They find that large Malaysian firms 
with low effective tax rates decrease book income prior to a reduction in corporate tax 
rates in order to influence tax policy. These findings are consistent with prior evidence in 
the U.S. that firms use accounting choice to achieve economic objectives. Saleh, Iskandar, 
and Rahma (2003) also provide some evidence that listed companies in Malaysia may 
practise earnings management. The current study adds to our knowledge on the choices 
of accounting accruals (hence earnings management) in Malaysia by using a different 
method for measuring the choices of accruals and performing a multi-period, vs. one-
period, analysis of these choices. 
Furthermore, this study extends previous studies by examining factors that may 
influence the accounting accrual choices by Malaysian managers within the socio-
economic and institutional environment of Malaysia. Due to the economic crisis in 1997-
1998, there was a rapid withdrawal of private capital by foreign investors and rapid expansion 
of credit to companies operating in Malaysia (Mahbob and Govindan, 2000). As a result, 
the corporate sector became more leveraged and heavily dependent on commercial bank 
financing after 1997. Financial difficulties faced by companies might have become an 
important factor that drove managers to improve upon their performance through earnings 
management. Meanwhile, the intervention by the Malaysian government to speed up the 
process of economic recovery in 1999 by reducing interest rates, increasing liquidity in 
the banking system, establishing a national asset management company, Danaharta, to 
buy non-performing loans from banks, and the establishment of Danamodal to capitalize 
financial institutions, might have become mitigating factors to the practice of earnings 
management.1 
We expand on the previous Malaysian studies by including all firms, other than 
those in the financial services rather than limiting the study to non-manufacturing 
companies. We also increase the number of variables which potentially impact earnings 
management to include debt covenants, political costs, internal financing, and equity 
ownership. The ownership variables that are included here are four types: individuals, 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership and nominee ownership2. As there is a 
possibility that managers of Malaysian companies had different incentives for earnings 
management in the years before and after the economic crisis, we test earnings management 
in Malaysia both before and after the economic crisis. 
The findings of this study are expected to shed more light on the reasons for earnings 
management in Malaysia. Consequently, it is expected that the results of this study may 
help the Malaysian standard setters better evaluate current accounting practices in 
Malaysian corporations. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides 
the literature review and hypotheses development. Section III describes the methodology 
used in this study. Empirical results are presented in Section IV and Section V offers 
concluding remarks. 
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Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Earlier studies typically were interested in the choice between different accounting methods. 
However, more recently, accounting research has focused on the firm's discretionary 
accruals (e.g. Healy, 1985; De Angelo, 1988; Jones, 1991; Cahan, 1992; Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney, 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002, Adhikari, et al, 2005). 
Discretionary accruals are defined as the part of total accruals that can be adjusted by 
managers within the constraints of accounting principles. These studies assume that 
total accruals are based on the activity of the firm and the discretionary portion is the 
amount that is being "managed" by the firm. 
The incentives for earnings management include capital market expectation and 
valuation, contracts written in terms of accounting numbers, and anti-trust or other 
government regulation (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). The initial empirical studies in accounting 
choice used positive agency costs of debt and compensation contracts and positive 
information and lobbying costs in the political process to generate hypotheses about 
accounting choice. For example, Watts (1977) recognized the implications of using 
accounting numbers in debt contracts on accounting choice and generated hypotheses 
about the effect of debt covenants on accounting accrual choice. There is no question 
that contracting costs that arise in market transactions external to the firm or transactions 
in the political process are crucial to models of both the organization of the firm and its 
choices of accounting accruals. 
The extent to which accounting choice affects the contracting parties' wealth depends 
on the relative magnitudes of the contracting costs. Contracts that use accounting numbers 
are not effective in aligning managers' and contracting parties' interests if managers have 
complete discretion over the reported accounting numbers. When managers exercise this 
discretion, it can be to increase the wealth of the contracting parties or make the manager 
better off at the expense of some other contracting party or parties (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990). 
It is possible that there are differences in earnings management behavior of Malaysian 
and U.S. companies. Roubi and Richardson (1998) find that earnings management in 
relation to tax policy changes are similar in the U.S., Canada and Singapore, but differ for 
Malaysian companies. They attribute the difference in behavior to differences in culture. 
Similarly, Guan, et al. (2005) show that earnings management is linked to cultural factors. 
Therefore, it remains an empirical question as to whether or not Malaysian companies will 
exhibit similar earnings management behavior as U.S. companies. 
Darrough, Pourjalali, and Saudagaran (1998) provide evidence that similar variables 
affected U.S. and Japanese earnings management in the 1990s. For example, they found 
that the debt-to-equity ratio explains accounting accruals choices in 1991 and 1992, but is 
not a determinant for 1989 and 1990. In addition, Land and Lang (2002) provide evidence 
that accrual/cash flow correlations (or accounting practices) have become more similar 
across countries over time. These findings may suggest that over time, managers operating 
in different countries adopt similar accounting accruals as their counterparts in the U.S = 
Given that the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) has been adopting International 
Accounting Standards (lASs) and the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) 
continues to do so, it is very possible that the variables explaining earnings management 
in the U.S. can explain earnings management in Malaysian companies3. 
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Prior research on earnings management in U.S. firms has identified a large set of 
variables that influence accounting choices. However, this study is limited to variables 
whose disclosure is required in Malaysia4. The explanatory variables for this study are 
limited to debt covenants, political cost, internal or external financing, ownership structure 
and the effect of the economic recession of 1997-1998. These variables are discussed in 
more details in the following paragraphs. 
Debt Covenants 
Watts (1977), using the results of Jensen and Meckling (1976), is the first to suggest that 
debt covenants might also influence the choice of accounting policies. Most accounting 
choice research has used the debt-to-equity ratio as a surrogate for a firm's closeness to 
debt covenant violations and found that the higher the debt-to-equity ratio, the more 
likely managers are to choose income-increasing accounting methods. Collins, Rozeff 
and Dhaliwal (1980), Holthausen (1980) and Leftwich (1980) argue that the higher the 
firms' debt-to-equity ratio, the more binding is the firms' debt covenants. Hence, they 
hypothesized that high debt-to-equity ratios are associated with income-increasing 
accounting alternatives. Thus, as the debt-to-equity ratio increases, income-increasing 
activity is expected; that is, a positive association is predicted. 
Given the rapid economic development of Malaysia in the first part of the 1990s, it is 
possible that the debt variable had no, or little, effect on earnings management. However, 
as the economic growth rate declined and the economic recession began, it is possible 
that managers of Malaysian companies become more concerned about the debt market. 
Hence, Malaysian behavior may become similar to their U.S. counterparts in choosing 
earnings increasing accruals as the debt levels increased. 
HI: The larger the Malaysian firm's debt-to-equity ratio, the more likely the manager is to 
choose income-increasing accruals. 
Political Costs 
Past studies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Zmijewski and Hagermen, 1981; Lilien and 
Pastena, 1982; Daley and Vigeland, 1983) often used size (measured by total assets) as a 
proxy for political sensitivity. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggest that in order to avoid 
the potential negative attention of government institutions, corporations employ a number 
of devices such as social responsibility campaigns in the media, government lobbying 
and selection of accounting procedures to minimize reported earnings. Because the public 
associates high profits with monopoly, firms would lower their reported earnings to reduce 
the likelihood of adverse political actions and thereby reduce its expected costs. Also 
included in political costs are the costs associated with labor unions which increase their 
demands of firms showing large reported profits. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) test the political cost hypothesis, predicting that larger 
firms are more likely to use accounting choices that reduce reported profits. They conclude 
that the evidence is consistent with the political cost hypothesis. However, there are difficulties 
with using firm size to proxy for political costs, including the likelihood that it may proxy for 
many other effects such as industry membership (Ball and Foster, 1982). 
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Despite the difficulties in using firm size as a proxy for political costs, an interesting 
finding is the consistency of the sign of the relationship between size and accounting 
choice across a variety of studies of U.S. companies. The larger firms tend to use income-
decreasing accounting methods. However, this expectation may not hold for Malaysian 
companies. For example, the Malaysian government has not been as concerned with anti-
trust regulation as has the United States. Hence, the government's political pressure on 
Malaysian companies may be considered less invasive when compared to that of the U.S. 
As mentioned earlier, the size variable may be a proxy for effects other than political 
sensitivity. For example, the operating characteristics of smaller firms may be significantly 
different from those of larger firms (e.g., greater default risk). Thus, it seems possible that 
accounting accrual behavior may differ based on the size of the firm because of factors 
other than political sensitivity. Darrough, Pourjalali and Saudagaran (1998) show that 
prior to the Japanese market crash of 1990, the size effect on choices of accounting 
accruals was either insignificant or in a direction contrary to expectations based on U.S. 
firm research. Although we do not believe that the size hypothesis will necessarily hold 
for Malaysian companies, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
H2: The larger the size of the Malaysian firm, the more likely the manager is to choose 
income-decreasing accruals. 
Tax Rate 
Hand and Skantz (1998) suggest that the findings supporting the political cost hypothesis 
are due to larger firms having more wealth available to be taxed by the government or 
special interest parties. Management may thus change accounting accruals to minimize 
company taxes. The influence of tax on other choices of accounting accruals can be 
related to the income tax rates. The higher the tax rate, the more beneficial income-decreasing 
methods would be. Adhikari, et. al (2005) report that larger Malaysian firms with low 
effective tax rates decreased their book income prior to a reduction in the tax rates. They 
provide evidence that tax rates affect accrual choices. However, given that the Malaysian 
government provided tax incentives (lower rates) after the market crash, there is less 
reason to believe that this hypothesis will hold after the Malaysian economic recession.. 
The following hypothesis is suggested to support the effect of tax on the choice of 
accounting accruals5: 
H3: The higher the Malaysian firm's tax rate, the more likely the manager is expected to 
choose income-decreasing accruals. 
Internal Financing 
Although the debt covenant variable (debt-to-equity ratio) captures the effect of the 
company's dependency on outside financing sources, it ignores the effect of internal 
source of financing, namely appropriated retained earnings. Once appropriated, the retained 
earnings cannot be used for dividend payments. The more firms are able to finance their 
operations via internal financing, the less they will need to obtain capital from external 
sources (an opposite and negative relationship between internal and external financing 
can be expected). Consequently, we anticipate that the managers who need more external 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN MALAYSIA: A STUDY ON EFFECTS OF ACCOUNTING CHOICES 
financing are more likely to use discretionary accounting accruals to present a better 
picture of their firms to outside parties. Since data are available to calculate internal 
financing (ratio of Appropriated Retained Earnings to Net Assets), we will use this ratio 
to test this suggestion with an expectation that there will be a negative relationship 
between internal financing and income-increasing choices of accounting accruals (opposite 
to the hypothesized sign in the case of external financing). 
H4: The lower the internal financing, the more likely that the manager chooses income 
increasing accruals. 
Ownership Variables 
Based on the World Bank (1999) assessment, companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) are categorised into four groups based on the relationship between 
the control and cash flow rights of the parties controlling the companies6. Given that the 
degree of control on cash flow rights differs by ownership category, it is possible that the 
degree of ownership by individual investors and others affects management's accounting 
accrual selection in Malaysia. 
Ownership by Individual Investors: Ke, Petroni and Safieddine (1999) compare the 
use of accounting-based incentive pay contracts across insurance firms with diffuse 
ownership, (i.e. those that are publicly-held) and insurance firms with the most concentrated 
ownership (i.e. those that are privately-held). They find a significant positive association 
between return on assets and the level of executive compensation only in the publicly-
held insurance companies. The change in compensation was also significantly more 
sensitive to the change in return on assets for publicly-held insurers than privately-held 
insurers. Results suggest that within privately-held firms, the reliance on accounting 
information for performance measurement is reduced due to relatively less separation 
between ownership and control. Due to the separation of ownership and control in many 
public corporations, the use of accounting information in the design of executive 
compensation is one of the most important issues in corporate governance. 
Darrough, Pourjalali and Saudagaran (1998) address the question of which factors 
influence accounting accrual choices by managers in Japan. In examining the effect of 
ownership on earnings management, they use five ownership categories: individual 
investors, management, securities brokers and investment trusts, other corporations, and 
other financial institutions. The time horizon of the ownership share of these different 
categories of investors is expected to vary. Their study shows that income-increasing 
choices are positively associated with the ownership by individual investors and trust 
companies, but negatively associated with the ownership by other corporations and 
financial institutions. 
Past studies show that U.S. companies have strong incentives to provide a more 
positive picture of the firm to individual investors who are the most important source of 
capital7 (Pourjalali, 1999). Hence, these companies choose accounting accruals to either 
smooth or increase income. In Japan, where individual investors hold only 24 per cent of 
total outstanding shares, there is less incentive for managers to manage earnings to paint 
a more positive picture of the company. Nevertheless, on the margin, as individual 
ownership increases, companies are expected to try to provide a better financial picture. 
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The same type of relationship might exist in Malaysian companies. The following states 
this hypothesis. 
H5: The higher the degrees of individual investors in the Malaysian firm's ownership 
structure, the more likely the manager is to choose income-increasing accruals. 
Ownership by the Management: Research revealed that manager-controlled firms 
and owner-conirolled firms have different goals. One way these differences manifest 
themselves is through the choice of accounting methods (e.g., Hunt, 1985 and Dhaliwal 
et al. 1982). Thus, the hypothesis is that the degree of managerial control affects accounting 
choices. 
One possible measure of managerial control is the per centage ownership of shares 
by the management. As ownership by management increases, managerial control increases. 
In the Malaysian environment, management has at least two incentives to choose income-
increasing accruals. First, income-increasing methods present a more favorable financial 
picture and may help prevent a takeover. Managers' resistance to takeovers is explained 
by the fact that they often lose their jobs or prerequisites (Azaradis and Stiglitz, 1983). 
Second, accounting-based bonus schemes are more likely to be found in manager-
controlled firms (Dhaliwal et al., 1982). 
In Malaysia, a manager's bonus is based on current income or other items derived 
using current income. Thus, it is suggested that managers in Malaysia would choose 
income-increasing accounting accruals to increase their bonuses. However, the choice is 
also affected by their degree of ownership in the company. Managers of Malaysian firms 
that have a lower degree of ownership in their companies may choose income-increasing 
accruals to increase their personal wealth via increased bonuses more than those managers 
who have a higher degree of ownership in their companies. The following hypothesis 
tests this conjecture: 
H6: The lower the degrees of ownership by management in Malaysian firms, the more 
likely the manager is to choose income-increasing accruals. 
Institutional Ownership: Institutional ownership provides a significant amount of 
the capital necessary for corporations. Institutional investors are more interested in long-
term benefits from their investments. They do not have strong incentives to increase their 
income by choosing income-increasing accruals (Phan and Yoshikawa, 1996). On the 
contrary, they have incentives to choose income-decreasing accruals in an attempt to 
provide long-term benefits such as minimization of tax payments. The following hypothesis 
tests this theory: 
H7: The higher the degree of ownership by other institutions in Malaysian firms, the 
more likely the manager is to choose income-decreasing accruals. 
Nominee Ownership: The final ownership hypothesis is related to the effect of 
investment by security brokers and investment trusts. Both these groups have a short-
term return perspective (versus investments by other corporations and institutions). As 
a result, we expect a positive relationship between the choice of income-increasing 
accounting accruals and the degree of ownership by these groups of investors. The 
following hypothesis is tested: 
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H8: The higher the degree of ownership by securities brokers and investment trusts in 
Malaysian firms, the more likely the manager is to choose income-increasing accruals. 
The 1997-1998 Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis in 1997-98 caused the drop in Ringgit in Malaysia8. The response of 
the government was to protect the economy from increasing global pressures on the 
Malaysian Economy. For example, the government introduced new exchange controls in 
1998 to prevent further manipulation of its currency. Furthermore, the government 
discouraged the transfer of currency to outside of Malaysia for at least a year. At the 
same time the government took many steps to increase the confidence of the foreign 
investments (such as implementing different level of governmental guarantees)9. 
Subsequently, since the economic environment has undergone a major change, the study 
must consider the possibility that the managers of Malaysian companies had different 
incentives for earnings management in the periods before and after the financial crisis. 
For this reason, the test results are provided for the periods before and after the Malaysian 
financial crisis. 
Methodology 
Sample Selection 
The sample consists of companies in all industries (excluding financial services) that are 
listed on the main board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) for the 10-year 
period from 1990 to 199910. The 10-year window was used to provide the opportunity to 
calculate the amount of earnings management (manipulation in accounting accruals) for 
years 1995 thorough 199911. A total of 248 listed companies on the KLSE were identified, 
but eight companies were excluded due to unavailability of data items (resulting in 240 
companies in the initial sample). Additional companies were eliminated from individual 
years because required information was not available for them during the specific year 
under study. As there were no electronic databases containing this information, data was 
collected directly from the financial statements of the companies. The sample may include 
the companies with financial difficulties (known as PN412) as they were listed in the main 
board before being classified as PN4 companies in year 2001. Table 1 provides a summary 
of the sample companies for each year during the period under study. 
Table 1: Summary of Sample 
Sample/Year 
Total companies 
Companies with missing 
Selected companies 
data 
1995 
240 
52 
188 
1996 
240 
45 
195 
1997 
240 
43 
197 
1998 
240 
44 
196 
1999 
240 
124 
116 
1995-1999 
(Company-year) 
1200 
308 
892 
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Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the estimated amount of manipulation in accounting 
accruals. Many of the past studies have used three different approaches in defining the 
accounting choice variable: (1) single procedures (e.g. Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979); 
two (2) sets of procedures (e.g. Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Press and Weintrop, 1990; 
Inoue and Thomas, 1996); (3) and net accruals (e.g. Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1988). The 
discretionary accruals concept was subsequently developed (Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney, 1995; Pourjalali and Hansen, 1996) and provided an improved means of 
detecting earnings management. Jones (1991) developed a model to capture the 
discretionary component of total accruals. She used an expectation model for total accruals 
to control for changes in the economic circumstances of each firm in order to relax the 
assumption that the changes in total accruals are due solely to changes in discretionary 
accruals. The expectation model uses an estimation period for each firm that ranges 
between 14 and 32 years. 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) assess the relative performance of five alternative 
discretionary accrual models at detecting earnings management. Their evaluation was 
made on alternative accrual-based models for detecting earnings management by comparing 
the specification and power of commonly used test statistics across the measures of 
discretionary accruals. They found that all of the models appear well specified when 
applied to a random sample of firm-years. Furthermore, the models all generate tests of 
low power for earnings management of economically plausible magnitudes (e.g. one to 
five per cent of total assets). They concluded that a modified version of the Jones (1991) 
model provides the most powerful test of earnings management. 
Pourjalali and Hansen (1996) subsequently developed a model that measures the amount 
of manipulation in the discretionary accruals. This model was developed to improve on 
Jones' (1991) model. They argue that the Jones (1991) model requires the use of a long 
stream of historical data to establish the expectation model. The long historical data necessary 
to establish the model may not be available and hence the model could not be used. Pourjalali 
and Hansen (1996) use only five (5) years of data to develop their model. 
The Discretionary Amount of Accrual Model 
The model used here to measure the manipulation in the amount of discretionary accruals 
is based on the modified version of Pourjalali and Hansen (1996) that was also used in 
Darrough, Pourjalali and Saudagaran (1998). The model is based on the assumption that 
discretionary choices can affect revenues, variable expenses, and fixed expenses. As a 
result, the total income effect of the discretionary choice of accounting accruals, At, can 
be expressed as the sum of three discretionary sub-components: 
At = Art + Avt + Aft 
Where; 
At = the total income effect of the discretionary choices for period t 
Art = the discretionary revenue effect 
A^ = the discretionary variable expense accrual effect 
Aft = the discretionary fixed expense accrual effect 
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The details on how these three discretionary components are derived and their 
related assumptions are discussed in Appendix 1 of this paper. 
In this study, the value of this variable is calculated for each year from 1995 to 1999. 
Each year's discretionary accrual is estimated based on financial data for the five years 
prior to the year under study. For example, the accrual effect for 1995 is estimated by 
using the financial information for years 1990 to 1994. 
Independent Variables 
Debt Covenants 
The extent of a firm's closeness to debt covenants is measured by the debt-to-equity 
ratio. This ratio has been extensively used to measure debt covenants in past studies 
(Watts, 1977; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal, 1980;Halthausen, 
1980; Leftwich, 1980; Duke and Hunt, 1990) 
Political Costs 
As mentioned previously, the political cost variables may be proxied for with either total 
assets or total number of employees. Since the total number of employees is not available, 
we use (the natural log of) total assets as a proxy for the political costs. A similar measure 
has also been used in several prior studies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1990; Zmijewski 
andHagermen, 1981;LilienandPastena, 1982; Daley and Vigeland, 1983; Ball and Foster, 
1982). 
Tax Rate 
Since it is not possible to determine the "true" marginal tax rate (i.e. the marginal tax rate 
without earnings management), this study uses an average effective tax rate based on the 
actual tax liability and income. To adjust for the benefit from depreciation expenses, the 
effective tax rate is estimated as the ratio of tax paid and accrued to current income plus 
depreciation. 
Internal/External Financing 
We use the ratio of appropriated retained earnings to net assets to calculate the degree of 
internal financing. It is expected that when internal financing decreases, firms have more 
incentive to choose income-increasing accounting accruals. Past studies (such as Darrough, 
Pourjalali and Saudagaran, 1998) have also used this ratio to measure internal financing. 
Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure is measured based on four ownership categories: individual 
ownership, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and nominee's ownership. 
The variables used to measure the four ownership categories is as follows: 
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Individual ownership is measured by the proportion of ordinary shares held by 
individual (and substantial, i.e., 5% or more) shareholders. 
Managerial ownership is measured by the proportion of ordinary shares held by the 
CEO and executive directors and shares in which they are deemed to have an interest. 
Institutional ownership is measured by the proportion of ordinary shares held by 
institutional block holders (including corporations, statutory boards, and government). 
Nominee ownership is measured by the proportion of ordinary shares held by security 
brokers and investment trusts. 
Results of the Study 
Independent Variables 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of these variables. The information in the table 
reflects the average performance of the company with respect to each variable over the 
period 1995 to 199913. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
Variable 
Total Debt-to-equity Ratio 
Natural Log of total Assets 
Tax Rate 
Internal Financing 
Individual Ownership 
Management Ownership 
Institutional Ownership 
Nominee's Ownership 
N 
892 
892 
892 
892 
892 
892 
892 
892 
Mean 
0.1363 
20.38244 
-0.30189 
0.08828 
0.16002 
0.16527 
0.41797 
0.25674 
Std Dev 
3.5790 
1.35955 
2.40933 
0.72668 
0.18336 
0.20452 
0.28850 
0.24090 
Minimum 
-4.17995 
15.65357 
-66.33060 
-11.66910 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Maximum 
94.0591 
24.36653 
5.08471 
1.28960 
0.98590 
0.98089 
0.99936 
0.99991 
Variable definition: 
Total Debt-to-equity Ratio 
Natural Log of total Assets 
Tax Rate 
Internal Financing 
Individual Ownership 
Managerial ownership 
Institutional ownership 
Nominee ownership 
Ratio of total debt to total equity. 
Natural log of total Assets. 
Ratio of tax paid and accrued to current income plus depreciation. 
Ratio of appropriated retained earnings on total assets 
Measured by the proportion of ordinary shares held by individual 
(and substantial, i.e., 5% or more) shareholders. 
Measured by the proportion of ordinary shares held by the CEO 
and executive directors and shares in which they are deemed to 
have an interest. 
Measured by the proportion of ordinary shares held by institutional 
blockholders (including corporations, statutory boards, and 
government). 
Measured by the proportion of ordinary shares held by security 
brokers and investment trusts. 
^ ^ 
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Table 3 reports the correlation matrix for the independent variables. As the Table 
indicates, statistically significant correlations are mostly among the ownership variables. 
This is not surprising as we expected that similar patterns of ownership would be present 
in different groups of industries14. Given the significant degrees of correlations among 
the ownership variables, it is possible that the effect of one ownership group on earnings 
management may be captured by another ownership variable. Consequently, one must be 
cautious when interpreting the results of the ownership variables. 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix for All Independent Variables 
Variables 
Total Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Natural Log of 
total Assets 
Tax Rate 
Management 
Ownership 
Individual 
Ownership 
Nominee 
Ownership 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Internal 
Financing 
Total 
Debt-to-
equity 
Ratio 
1 
0.03378 
0.3135 
-0.00138 
0.9672 
-0.03617 
0.2805 
-0.06666 
0.0466 
0.02844 
0.3962 
0.04607 
0.1692 
-0.00087 
0.9793 
Natural Tax Rate Manage- Individual Nominee Institu- Internal 
Log of ment Owner- Owner- tional Financing 
total Owner- ship ship Owner-
Assets ship ship 
1 
0.02562 
0.4448 
0.02138 
0.5236 
-0.15083 
<.0001 
0.14826 
<.0001 
-0.03874 
0.2478 
-0.04545 
0.175 
1 
-0.0023 
0.9446 
0.00384 
0.9087 
0.01862 
0.5786 
-0.0164 
0.6255 
0.00673 
0.8408 
1 
-0.11749 
0.0004 
-0.1916 
<.0001 
-0.4724 
<.0001 
-0.0273 
0.4155 
1 
-0.26822 
<.0001 
-0.35452 
<.0001 
0.13787 
<.0001 
1 
-0.51809 
<.0001 
-0.03115 
0.3527 
1 
-0.04585 
0.1712 
1 
Note: For variable definitions, please see Table 2. 
Three other variables have significant relationships with the ownership variables. 
One is the natural log of total assets that is highly correlated with Individual ownership 
and Nominee ownerships. The direction of these correlations is worth mentioning as it 
indicates that larger companies have higher Nominee ownerships and smaller companies 
have higher individual ownerships. These directions, in part, suggest that the management 
of different sized companies may have different earnings management incentives because 
of different stockholders structures. 
The internal financing variable and the debt-to-equity ratio are also significantly 
correlated to individual ownership, indicating that companies with a greater proportion of 
individual owners in Malaysia retain larger amounts of appropriated retained earnings in 
their firms and rely less on debt financing. 
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Results of Analysis 
Data is analyzed using Ordinary Least Square (OLS). Each hypothesis is tested in two 
different ways: by company-year (pooled) and by calendar-year. 
Company-Year Results 
Table 4 reports results of the analysis for the company-year of the entire period from 1995 
to 1999. The objective of this analysis is to examine the relationship between earnings 
management (income effect of discretionary accruals) and each independent variable for 
each individual year as well as the entire period covering 1995 to 1999. 
Panel one of the Table reports the regression results for years 1995, 1996, and 1997 
(pre-market-crash). Panel two of the Table reports the regression results for years 1998 
(the year of the market crash) and 1999. The result of all company-years is also reported in 
the last columns of Panel two. Below is the description of the results based on the 
hypotheses developed earlier. 
Debt Covenants: Contrary to findings in most earnings management studies, the 
debt-to-equity ratio does not significantly explain earnings management in Malaysia for 
Table 4: Results for the Test of Hypotheses for Years 1995 to 1999, and for All 
Years Pooled 
Panel one: Results of the regression for years 
Variables/year 
Intercept 
Debt-to-Equity 
Ratio 
Natural Log of 
Total Assets 
Tax Rate 
Internal Financing 
Individuals 
Ownership 
Management 
Ownership 
Nominee's 
Ownership 
Year 1995 
N = 188 
R-Square 
Adj R-Sq 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-1.41E+08 
24.56212 
5017098 
-114172 
735285 
29532799 
58381720 
46736300 
0.7190 
0.7065 
Pr > |t| 
0.0678 
0.7355 
0.1804 
0.9113 
<.0001 
0.2827 
0.02 
0.0434 
before the economic downturn. 
Year 1996 
N = 195 
R-Square 
Adj R-Sq 
Parameter 
Estimate 
1304456864 
645.36235 
-65152197 
7429106 
-2.7169 
257078040 
54328402 
415515540 
0.0423 
0.0011 
Pr > |t| 
0.0659 
0.9156 
0.0528 
0.8097 
0.6588 
0.3139 
0.8123 
0.0376 
Year=1997 
N = 197 
R-Square 0.0530 
Adj R-Sq 0.0127 
Parameter 
Estimate 
1187222439 
198.21324 
-58976294 
-104768883 
33226122 
191195696 
18227219 
276965807 
Pr>|t| 
0.0296 
0.7048 
0.0202 
0.1396 
0.6254 
0.2904 
0.9127 
0.0604 
^ ^ 
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(Cont.) Table 4: Results for the Test of Hypotheses for Years 1995 to 1999, 
and for All Years Pooled 
Panel two: Results of the regression for 1998 and 1999 and all company-years. 
Variables/year 
Intercept 
Debt-to-Equity 
Ratio 
Natural Log of 
Total Assets 
Tax Rate 
Internal Financing 
Individuals 
Ownership 
Management 
Ownership 
Nominee's 
Ownership 
Year 1998 
N = 196 
R-Square 
Adj R-Sq 
Parameter 
Estimate 
313396870 
53.90739 
-11853767 
5534749 
4994082 
-133304784 
-80285486 
-46336842 
0.0130 
-0.0293 
Pr > |t| 
0.3292 
0.8938 
0.4242 
0.7966 
0.75 
0.219 
0.4008 
0.5954 
Year 1999 
N = 116 
R-Square 
Adj R-Sq 
Parameter 
Estimate 
6.61E+08 
-200.726 
-3.4E+07 
-5.4E+07 
36613600 
-4E+07 
58097129 
11731589 
0.1291 
0.0640 
Pr > |t| 
0.0013 
0.9007 
0.0007 
0.2104 
0.1619 
0.5703 
0.366 
0.834 
All Year 
N = 892 
R-Square 0.0204 
Adj R-Sq 0.0116 
Parameter 
Estimate 
646380305 
70.30364 
-32249505 
-663283 
-0.98591 
73527579 
7329970 
159114257 
Pr > |t| 
0.0015 
0.7899 
0.0008 
0.9027 
0.7899 
0.3104 
0.9105 
0.0059 
Bold items: Significant at 0.07 level. 
Note: For variable definitions, please see Table 2. 
any of the years in this study. We had predicted that closeness to debt covenants (as 
measured by the debt-to-equity ratio) would not have a significant effect on earnings 
management during the economic development of Malaysia in the first part of the 1990s, 
but we expected that as the economic growth rate declined and the economic recession 
began, managers of Malaysian companies would become more concerned about the debt 
market and chose those accruals that would result in higher income. While the results 
confirm the first part, the later part of our expectation has not materialized15. The lack of 
results may also be due to the assistance that was provided by the Malaysian government 
in the years following the economic recession through two newly formed companies, 
Danamodal and Danaharta. These companies helped prevent ailing companies from going 
into immediate bankruptcy, which may have caused companies to be indifferent about 
their debt covenants. 
Political Costs: This study uses the natural log of total assets as a surrogate measure 
of political sensitivity. Most earnings management studies have indicated that larger 
firms tend to use income-decreasing accounting methods to avoid political costs. However, 
as the Malaysian government may be considered friendlier to large businesses and as 
^fe 
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these companies have not been as concerned with anti-trust regulation (as their U.S. 
counterparts), we suggested the possibility that political costs may not have an influence 
on earnings management in Malaysia. The results in Table 4, however, suggest that 
managers of larger Malaysian companies, similar to their counterparts in the United States, 
choose income-decreasing accounting accruals and manage earnings downward in most 
years (every year but 1995 and 1998). The results indicate that although the Malaysian 
Government supports larger businesses and may not impose political penalties for larger 
amounts of earnings, pressures from other political parties (such as employees, costumers, 
and suppliers) may influence management's decision on reporting lower earnings figures 
to avoid possible political costs16. 
Tax Rate: This paper suggests that higher tax rates may result in the choices of 
income-decreasing accruals. The results reported in Table 4 do not support this hypothesis. 
In part, this may be related to the very low corporate tax rates in Malaysia. As reported 
earlier, the effective tax rate continued to decrease from 1995 to 1999. Furthermore, the 
Malaysian government provided additional tax incentives (lower effective rates) after the 
market crash. As such, there is less reason to see any relationship between the effective 
tax rate and earnings management in Malaysia. Pourjalali and Hansen (1996) also show 
that there was no significant effect of tax rates on income accruals for U.S. companies17. 
Internal Financing: Our expectation on the effect of internal financing (measured by 
the ratio of appropriated retained earnings to total assets) on earnings management was 
that lower internal financing would result in more choices of income-increasing accounting 
accruals (managing earnings upward). Except in 1995 (and in opposite direction), there 
was no significant association between the degree of internal financing and earnings 
management. It appears that the managers of Malaysian companies are not influenced by 
the level of appropriated retained earnings in making their earnings management decisions. 
Due to the significant degree of correlation between internal financing and individual 
ownership (see Table 3), it is possible that the effect of internal financing on earnings 
management is captured by the individual ownership variable. However, as will be 
mentioned in the next paragraph, we could not find any statistically significant association 
between earnings management and individual ownership either. 
Ownership variables: We measured the ownership variables based on four ownership 
categories: individual ownership, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and 
nominee ownership. As we could not obtain the total number of outstanding shares 
easily and to avoid including large numbers of shares in the model18, the total number of 
outstanding shares was assumed to be the total number of shares in all four categories. 
To calculate the proportion of shares held by each category of stockholders, we divided 
the number of shares in each category by the total of number of outstanding shares 
(calculated, using the assumption mentioned above). This resulted in a linear relationship 
among the proportions that would be included in the model (they always add to a total of 
1 or 100%), which would cause regression errors. To avoid the linearity problem, we 
dropped institutional ownership from the model and ran the regression without this 
variable. It was hoped that if there were a significant effect resulting from institutional 
ownership, the effect would be captured by the Intercept in the regression analysis. We 
expected that higher degrees of individual and nominee ownerships would result in income-
increasing behaviour and higher degrees of management and institutional ownerships 
would result in income-decreasing behaviour. 
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The results indicate that nominee ownership has the expected effect on earnings 
management in years prior to the market crash of 1998 (this variable is also significant for 
the pooled sample). Management ownership has a significant effect in 1995, however, the 
sign is opposite to expectations. No other ownership variables show a significant effect 
on companies' earnings management. Interestingly, the intercept is significant in all 
regression analysis (other than 1998)19. Overall, it appears that there is some degree of 
ownership effect on the choices of accounting accruals in Malaysia during the years 1995 
to 1999. 
The 1997-1998 Financial Crisis: One of the most interesting findings of this study 
is that in 1998 all of the traditional and ownership independent variables seem to have lost 
their ability to explain earnings management. It appears that a combination of the drop in 
Ringgit (Malaysian currency) and major changes in the economic environment affected 
the incentives for earnings management in periods during, and to some extent after, the 
financial crisis20. The findings in 1998 may be attributable to the bubble of the economic 
crisis and may suggest that the Malaysian managers did not have a clear picture of the 
economy during this year. Consequently, a detectable pattern for earnings management 
can not be found. 
Summary, Discussion and Conclusion 
Although Malaysia had the largest debt market and equity market in ASEAN around the 
mid-90s (OECD, 1999), studies of earnings management in Malaysian companies are 
scarce. This study uses a sample of companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) to examine earnings management in Malaysian companies for the years 1995 to 
1999. The dependent variable in this study is a discretionary accrual variable. This 
amount is calculated using a model that incorporates changes in the discretionary 
accounting accruals without employing the accounting method directly. Traditional 
explanatory variables for earnings management (such as size and debt-to-equity ratio), 
tax rate, internal financing, and ownership variables were included in the model to explain 
the choices of accounting accruals (or earnings management) in Malaysia. Since the 
economic downturn (1997) and market crash (1998) years are included in the sample years, 
we are also able to evaluate their effect on earnings management. This study finds at least 
two factors affecting choice of accounting accruals; size of the company (measured in 
natural log of total assets), and nominee ownership. The results suggest that managers 
choose income-increasing accounting accruals to improve the financial picture portrayed 
by the financial statements to attract investment from security brokers and investment 
trusts. These groups (called nominees in this paper) hold over 25% of the outstanding 
shares of public companies in Malaysia. This income-increasing behavior remains 
consistent both before and after the economic crisis in Malaysia. 
The size of the companies also affects earnings management in Malaysia. The larger 
the firm, the more likely it will choose income-decreasing accounting accruals (downward 
earnings management). This result is similar to the findings of studies that concentrate on 
U.S. companies. Debt-to-equity ratio, effective tax rate, and internal financing do not have 
a significant effect on earnings management in Malaysian companies. No explanatory 
variable is significant during the market crash year, 1998, suggesting that during the 
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market crash managers did not choose a systematic earnings management policy that 
could be detected by the regression model. 
The lack of results for some of the hypotheses developed in this paper may, in part, 
have originated from the differences in the corporate financing in Malaysia. Most large 
Malaysian companies are supported by the government through Danaharta and 
Danamodal. This financial system has created a credit-based business environment that 
is heavily dependent on banks to finance corporate financial needs (Aman and Desa, 
1998). Banks in Malaysia have become the dominant source of debt financing as their 
share of domestic debt increased from 62% in 1986 to 75% in 1997. Over the same period, 
the debt market from public sources (bonds, etc.) decreased from 38% to 25%. It has been 
argued that the close relationship between government, business and finance has led to 
high debt-to-equity ratios in the corporate sector (Mahbob and Govindan, 2000). Contrary 
to cases in the U.S., this increase in the debt-to-equity ratio does not suggest that the 
firms are close to debt covenants or under financial pressures of the debt holders. This 
may be a peculiar feature of the Malaysian financial system which differs from the 
environment in other countries such Japan or the U.S. 
Although this study has data limitations21, the results contribute to the existing 
literature on international earnings management. Our findings shed light on some of the 
reasons that Malaysian firms manage earnings. In addition, it supports the notion that the 
reasons for earnings management may differ from one nation to another. An extension of 
this study can provide additional evidence on earnings management after the 1998 market 
crash as the results may not be generalizable to the period subsequent to 1988 after the 
Malaysia government introduced a new regulatory environment. The new study may 
provide different results as the Malaysian economic environment has changed 
substantially after 1998 (new government policies, changes in the accounting authorities 
and so on). This study can also be extended to include detailed information for other 
relevant factors such as equity ownership by foreign investors, management bonus 
plans, and corporate governance22. 
Notes 
1
 Some of the changes as a result of the economic crises in 1997 and 1998 were 
establishments and modification of regulatory bodies such as: 
• Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB). MASB was established under 
the Financial Reporting Act 1997 as an independent authority to develop and 
issue accounting and financial reporting standards in Malaysia. 
• Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM). A division under the Ministry of 
Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs established on April 2002. 
• Bursa Malaysia (previously Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange). A self-regulatory 
organization which governs the conduct of its members and member stockbroking 
companies in securities dealings; it enforces the listing requirements which spell 
out the listing and disclosure standards to be maintained by public listed 
companies; and which is also responsible for the surveillance of the market place. 
For additional information, please see http://www.micpa.com.my/public/ 
relatedjink.asp 
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2
 Very few studies have considered including ownership type as a possible explanatory 
variable for accounting, accrual choices. 
3
 International accounting methods and standards have been developing through 
organizations such as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the European Union (EU), and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
4
 For example, variables such as those related to information about management bonus 
contracts, industry effect, and the degree of closeness-to-debt-covenant-violation 
were excluded in this study as we did not have relevant data. 
5
 Our data base did not include information for deferred taxes (or tax prepayments); as 
such the effect of these items on the choices of accounting accruals are not reported 
in this study. It is possible that such items provide different incentives in earnings 
management for companies. For example, when the amount of deferred taxes are 
substantial, the management may have a higher incentive to defer earnings to avoid 
a large cash outflow for taxes. A similar argument (and in opposite direction) can be 
hold for cases of tax prepayments. 
6
 These categories are (1) management-controlled companies with dispersed 
shareholding; (2) shareholder-controlled companies where the controlling shareholder 
has a direct majority stake with control rights more closely aligned with cash flow 
rights; (3) shareholder-controlled companies where the controlling shareholder has a 
direct but a substantial minority stake with his control rights aligned with his cash 
flow rights (probably to a less extent than the category 2 companies); and (4) 
shareholder-controlled companies where the controlling shareholder has only an 
indirect stake. 
7
 Individual investors in the U.S. hold an average of 49 per cent of total outstanding 
shares. 
8
 World Trade Organization (WTO) reports that during the 1992-1996 presiod, 40% of 
Malaysian GDP was through additional investments. Investment was encouraged 
by tax and non-tax incentives. See 
http://www. wto. org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp67_e. htm for further explanation. 
9
 International Trade and Finance: Current Treands and Difficulties. By Wong Sau 
Ngan, Reported at http://www. mlj. com. my/free/articles/wongsn. htm#l 
10
 The study is focused only on the companies listed on the main board hence those 
listed on the second board are not included in the sample. The sample does not 
distinguish companies with financial difficulties from those having sound financial 
standing. 
11
 The dependent variable model in this study uses information in the five years prior to 
the estimation date. 
12
 The PN4 companies were introduced in 2001, which is not within the period of the 
study. PN4 companies received KLSE revamped listing conditions. Essential 
conditions forced listed companies to, within a given time frame, restructure and 
meet adequate financial conditions in order for them to be allowed to continue trading 
on the exchange. 
13
 What is not evident in Table 2 is that the total debt-to-equity ratio increases during 
the period 1995 to 1997 and declines in 1998 (market crash year). However, the ratio 
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increases significantly in 1999. Overall, the debt-to-equity ratio increases over the 
period from 1995 to 1999 among the KLSE listed companies. Similarly, there was a 
steady increase in total assets of the company from RM1.33 billion in 1995 to RM2.0 
billion in 1999. An analysis of the data reveals that the tax rate has decreased gradually 
from 1995 to 1999 to the level of 0.03%. This drastic decrease may be due to the 
transition of the government tax policy which resulted in tax exemptions on income 
earned in 1999. 
We are unable to test this hypothesis, however, as the number of companies within 
each industry is not large enough to make a definite conclusion. 
It is possible that the effect would be reflected in years after 1999. Consequently, 
additional studies are warranted here to address such possibility. 
We did not have information about the political affiliation of companies included in 
our sample. It is possible that the political affiliation provides different earnings 
management incentives. Although one can suggest that the inclusion of ownership 
variable may capture political affiliation effects, a more direct study of the effect of 
political affiliation on earnings management is warranted. 
This result is different from evidence provided in Adhikari, et. al (2005). The mentioned 
study provided evidence that, for selected large with low effective tax rate companies, 
earnings management took place in response to anticipated changes in tax policy. 
The lack of results in our study can be attributed to our inclusion of all companies in 
the sample (instead of selected companies). Furthermore, this study does not directly 
test for a change in tax policy or rate. 
If we include the total number of shares, the results will be substantially affected by 
the magnitude of the number of shares, which is larger when the company is larger, 
and will be difficult to interpret the effect. 
This significance may be, in part, a result of capturing the effect of institutional 
ownership on earnings management. Since the direction of the intercept is not 
consistent, this interpretation is questionable 
The test results for 1999 reveal that the nominee's ownership effect is no longer a 
significant variable in explaining earnings management. However, the size variable 
continues to be significant. The lack of result for nominee ownership may be 
attributable to several factors; change in government regulation, increase in the 
amount of internal financing, and government tax incentives after the financial crisis. 
See footnote 4 for further explanation. 
For example, Saleh, Rahmat and Iskandar (2005) and Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat 
(2005) find the presence of board members with multiple directorship experience, and 
financially literate and independent audit committee members improve the 
effectiveness of detecting earnings management. 
FRS 108 requires that the current (or catch-up) approach be employed to account for 
changes in accounting principles. The cumulative effect of the adjustment should be 
reported in the income statement, (Malaysian Standard Board publication: http:// 
www.masb.org.my/masbstd_aas01.htm). 
It is possible that managers can manipulate variable cash expenses as well. If the 
variable cash expense ratio is not constant because of manipulative behavior, then 
the change in the total cost ratio will also pick up this manipulation—an outcome that 
is obviously desirable. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Model Used to Estimate Earnings Management 
(Choices of Accounting Accruals) 
The accounting choice variable should measure the income effect of all discretionary 
choices made by a manager for a given period. Let A be the total income effect of the 
discretionary choices for period t. Since discretionary choices can affect revenues, variable 
expenses, and fixed expenses, At can be expressed as the sum of three discretionary sub-
components: 
A = A + A + A, 
t rt vt ti 
where 
Art = the discretionary revenue effect 
A^ = the discretionary variable accrual effect 
Aft = the discretionary fixed accrual effect 
Assessing each sub-component's effect provides a measure for the total discretionary 
effect. The following assumptions are needed to build the desired measurement model: 
1. Receivables Assumption. The ratio of true accounts receivable to true sales revenues 
can be measured using the average prior period balances for these accounts; also, 
the ending accounts receivable balance is correctly stated for period t. "True" is 
defined as the amount that would be reported without manipulative changes. 
2. Cost Behavior Assumption. Cost behavior can be described as a linear function of 
reported revenues. This function can be measured using the average prior period 
balances for costs (operating expenses) and sales revenues. 
3. Fixed Expense Assumption. The only significant fixed expenses are depreciation and 
amortization. Furthermore, APB Opinion 20 is operative23. 
Assessing the Discretionary Revenue Effect. The Receivable assumption suggests 
that a true ratio for accounts receivable to revenues exists. This ratio can be found using 
the following: 
K = A R ( t -n to t - l ) / R ( t -n to t - l ) 
Where: 
n is an arbitrary length of time that is long enough to calculate the actual 
(unmanipulated) ratios. This time period usually varies from 5 to 10 years 
(periods), 
t is the year under study. Then t-1 is the year before the year under study 
and so on. 
K is the firm's normal accounts receivable to revenues ratio (averaged from 
t-ntot-1). 
R„
 f ., is the firm's total revenue from t-ntot-1. 
(t-n to t-1) 
AR
 f ,, is the firm's total accounts receivable from t-n to t-1. 
(t-n to t-1) 
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Assuming that management has manipulated the revenue in period t, the accounts 
receivable to sales revenue ratio for t (K = AR / R ) is not equal to K. Thus, using the 
receivables assumption and the calculated receivables factor, K, the true (nonmanipulated) 
revenues, RTt, can be computed: 
AK = K-K ( t ) 
RIt = (ARl*AK + R1) 
Given RTt, the revenues manipulated in period t, R , can be computed: 
The total variable cost ratio is the difference between the total expenses and fixed 
expenses (i.e., the depreciation and amortization expenses), divided by reported revenues: 
bt = (E t-F)/R 
where 
E = total reported operating expenses 
F = Depreciation + Amortization (by the fixed expense assumption) 
Finally, the income effect of manipulated revenues for period t can be calculated 
using R^  andb: 
° at t 
Art = (Rdt)(l-b t) 
Assessing the Variable Accrual Effect. By the Cost Behavior assumption, the average 
variable accrued cost ratio of periods t-n to t-1 can serve as the benchmark for assessing 
discretionary changes in variable accrued expenses in period t. Essentially, the change in 
the average variable accrued expense ratio for periods t-n to t-1 to period t signals a 
discretionary change that belongs only to period t. Thus, the income effect is simply the 
change in ratio multiplied by the true revenues of period t. The income effect of manipulating 
variable accrued expenses is computed as follows24. 
A vt = (b(t-ntot- l)-bt)RTt 
Note that if (b(t_ntot_1) - bt) > 0, then income-increasing behavior is signaled. The 
opposite is signaled if (b ( tn to t l ) - b) < 0. 
Assessing the Fixed Accrual Effect Assessment of the fixed accrual effect relies on 
the fixed expense assumption. By this assumption, the only significant fixed accrued 
expenses are depreciation and amortization. Any changes in assessing these expenses 
and their effects on income must be disclosed. Since changes in accounting practices do 
not result from changes in a firm's underlying economic situations, all income effects of 
changes in the accounting practices are assumed manipulative. This amount is found by 
inspecting the income statement for period t. 
^m 
